ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (SEPTEMBER 4-SEPTEMBER 8)

Good afternoon,

Following are the summaries for this week’s civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

In Daniel v Miller, Canfield, a partner of a law firm sued her old firm for wrongful dismissal after the firm was dissolved. She relied on the Supreme Court’s Human Rights Code decision in McCormick v. Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, 2014 SCC 39 to argue that she was really an employee. She was unsuccessful at trial and in a fairly brief endorsement, her appeal was dismissed, much to the relief of law firms nationwide, I’m sure.

In an insurance coverage decision in National Gallery of Canada v Lafleur de la Capitale Inc., the Court allowed the appeal solely on the basis that the application judge’s reasons for decision did not allow for meaningful appellate review. The case was remitted to the Superior Court for a new hearing in front of a different judge.

Other topics covered this week included  a division of powers/constitutional law decision in the taxation/aboriginal law context, malicious prosecution and security for costs.

Have a nice weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos

Blaney McMurtry LLP

jpolyzogopoulos@blaney.com

Tel: 416 593 2953

http://www.blaney.com/lawyers/john-polyzogopoulos

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd. v. Ontario (Finance), 2017 ONCA 680

Keywords: Constitutional Law, Division of Powers, , Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91 and 92, Pith and Substance, Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22, Double Aspect Doctrine, Canada Post Corp. v. Hamilton (City), 2016 ONCA 767, Taxation, Tobacco Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.10, s. 12(2)(f. 1), Guindon v. Canada, 2015 SCC 41, Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, ss. 87(1) and (2), Statutory Interpretation, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27

National Gallery of Canada v. Lafleur de la Capitale Inc.

Keywords: Insurance Law, Comprehensive General Liability, Coverage, Duty to Defend, Procedural and Natural Justice, Duty to Provide Reasons

Farley v. Ottawa (Police Services Board), 2017 ONCA 689

Keywords: Torts, Malicious Prosecution, Negligent Investigation, Constitutional Law, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Reasonable and Probable Grounds, Miazga v. Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51, Summary Judgment

Novak v. St. Demetrius (Ukrainian Catholic) Development, 2017 ONCA 693

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Security for Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61.06(1)(a), York University v. Markicevic, 2017 ONCA 651

Daniel v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, LLP, 2017 ONCA 697

Keywords: Employment Law, Wrongful Dismissal, Partnerships, Law Firms, McCormick v. Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, 2014 SCC 39, Standard of Review, Mixed Fact and Law, Palpable and Overriding Error

Lin v. Fleury, 2017 ONCA 695

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Jurisdiction, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule  2.1(01)(1)

For Criminal Decisions, click here.

For Civil Endorsements, click here.

Civil Decisions

Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd. v. Ontario (Finance), 2017 ONCA 680

[Strathy, Cronk and Pepall JJA] 

Counsel:

Brian Duxbury and Ben A. Jetten, for the appellant

Lise G. Favreau, Michael S. Dunn and Padraic Ryan, for the respondent

 Keywords: Constitutional Law, Division of Powers, , Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91 and 92, Pith and Substance, Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22, Double Aspect Doctrine, Canada Post Corp. v. Hamilton (City), 2016 ONCA 767, Taxation, Tobacco Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.10, s. 12(2)(f. 1), Guindon v. Canada, 2015 SCC 41, Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, ss. 87(1) and (2), Statutory Interpretation, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27

Facts:

The appellant is the largest Canadian exporter of tobacco. It manufactures tobacco on the Six Nations of the Grand Reserve Territory in Ontario. It produces tobacco for export and tobacco products for sale to “Indians” and “bands” on “reserves”, within the meaning of the Indian Act. It does not sell tobacco to retailers outside reserves and does not sell to consumers who are required to pay taxes under the Tobacco Tax Act (the “TTA”).

The TTA regulates the manufacture, distribution and retail sale of tobacco products in order to collect tax. It imposes a tax on consumers of tobacco products, with the exception of tobacco products sold to “Indians” on a “reserve” for use by “Indians” which are not subject to tax. As part of the regulatory system established by the TTA, each party in the distribution chain is required to obtain a permit or registration certificate and to account for its tobacco supplies. This includes entities whose tobacco is not subject to taxable sale in Ontario because it is intended for export or sale on reserves.

Section 12(2)(f.1) of the TTA requires the Minister of Finance (the “Minister”) to demand security from parties, like the appellant, who manufacture and sell tobacco intended for export or for sale on First Nations reserves.  In December 2013, the Minister issued two permits to the appellant. One authorized the possession, storage and sale of unmarked fine cut tobacco (“UFCT”) for export. The other authorized the sale of UFCT to First Nations retailers. The Minister subsequently informed the appellant that he would be seeking security in relation to the issued permits.

The appellant took the position that the Minister’s demand for security was unlawful because no tax was payable on tobacco produced for export or for sale on reserves.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application. This court granted the appellant leave to appeal.

Issues:

(1) Is the Minister’s demand for security unreasonable and arbitrary?

(2)  Is s. 12(2)(f.1) of the Tobacco Tax Act constitutionally valid or applicable to tobacco destined for export or for sale on a reserve?

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

(1) No. The Minister’s interpretation of the provision was reasonable and is entitled to deference.

The appellant’s interpretation of the statute is illogical. It submits that the definition of UFCT, when read with the definition of “marked fine cut tobacco”, means that UFCT must be in a “box, tin or other container” used for retail sale. The appellant argues that  since its export tobacco is not packaged in this manner, it is not UFCT.

However, the modern approach to statutory interpretation requires that the words of an act are read within its entire context and in harmony with its scheme, its object and the intention of Parliament (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27). “Marked fine cut tobacco” is defined under s. 1(1) as “fine cut tobacco in a package that is marked or stamped with an indicium as required under the regulations”. This refers to fine cut tobacco that has a mark or stamp on its packing to indicate that taxes have been paid. UFCT is defined as “fine cut tobacco” that is not tobacco falling within the definition of “marked fine cut tobacco.” “Fine cut tobacco” is not defined in the TTA. It is, however, defined in the Regulation as “loose tobacco product that has been refined to the point where it could be formed  into a cigarette”. The court found that since the appellant’s tobacco is “fine cut tobacco” and is not “marked fine cut tobacco” it clearly falls within the definition of UFCT.

The appellant never objected to the issuance of the permits to purchase and sell UFCT. The words of s. 12(2) are mandatory and therefore require the Minister to demand       security.

The appellant’s submission that its product is “partially manufactured tobacco” and not “fine cut tobacco” is contradicted by the evidence of its own witness.

(2) Yes. Section 12(2)(f.1) is constitutionally valid because it is incidental to a scheme of direct taxation within the province.

The pith and substance analysis (Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22) supports the constitutionality of s. 12(2)(f.1). The provision cannot be divorced from its context. The appellant acknowledges that the direct tax imposed by the TTA is constitutionally valid. The collection of the tax from wholesalers rather than retailers does not transform it into an ultra vires indirect tax. Nor does the enforcement process for the collection of the tax have the effect of taxing parties who are part of the collection process. The pith and substance of the TTA is plainly the imposition of a tax on the consumption of tobacco.  This is direct taxation within the province and falls squarely within provincial jurisdiction under s. 92(2). The purpose and effect of the legislation is to elaborate the marking regime, the registration and permitting system and the collection machinery designed to serve this end. Section 12(2)(f.1) is in pith and substance a provision in furtherance of the legislative scheme to ensure the integrity of the machinery for collection of the tax.

The double aspect doctrine (Canada Post Corp. v. Hamilton (City), 2016 ONCA 767) further permits both levels of government to legislate in relation to different aspects of the regulation of the same commodity. The purpose of the provision is not to single out or punish wrongdoers, but rather to proactively protect against lost tax revenue should product be diverted out of non-taxable markets and into the domestic market.

In Guindon v. Canada, 2015 SCC 41, the appellant argued that a provision under the Income Tax Act (the “ITA”) was criminal in nature and that consequently she was entitled to the protection of s. 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In rejecting this submission, the Supreme Court found that “provisions, such as administrative monetary penalties, that encourage compliance by these non-taxpayers are integral to the ITA’s regulatory regime and are not criminal in nature simply because the target is not the taxpayer.” The Court of Appeal found this case instructive in this case. The court noted that the administrative penalties, fines and other assessments in the TTA are similarly integral to the scheme of the Act.

National Gallery of Canada v. Lafleur de la Capitale Inc.2017 ONCA 688

[Rouleau, van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:
Kelly Hart, for the appellants

Mark Charron and Stephanie Doucet, for the respondent

Keywords: Insurance Law, Comprehensive General Liability, Coverage, Duty to Defend, Procedural and Natural Justice, Duty to Provide Reasons

Facts:

The appellants, Intact Insurance Company (“Intact”) and Lafleur de la Capitale Inc.”, appeal from an order requiring them to assume and fund the two actions brought forth by the respondent, National Gallery of Canada.

In August 2013, an employee of Lafleur, Conrad Lafrenière, tragically suffered fatal injuries in the course of his employment. He was carrying out maintenance work on a vehicle ramp located on the respondent’s premises. When a vehicle approached to enter the underground garage, Mr. Lafrenière stepped back towards the ledge of the ramp and fell.

The two underlying actions were commenced against the respondent by the spouse of the late Mr. Lafrenière (“the Arsenault action”) and other family members bringing claims under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (“the Lafrenière action”).

Under a contract between the respondent and Lafleur de la Capitale Inc. (“Lafleur”) for landscaping and maintenance services at the respondent’s premises (the “maintenance contract”), the appellant Lafleur was required to add the respondent as a named insured under its comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) policy with Intact. This policy provides for coverage of not less than five million dollars per occurrence for bodily injury or property damage.

A January 21, 2014 Endorsement to the policy adds the respondent as an additional insured “but only insofar as [its] Legal Liability arises vicariously out of the operations of [Lafleur] in connection with [its landscaping and snow removal services]”.

The CGL policy contains numerous exclusions. Relevant to these proceedings are the exclusions for workers’ compensation claims and claims arising out of an employer’s liability for injuries to employees incurred in the course of employment.

In answering whether or not Intact owed the respondent a duty to defend the two actions, the application judge provided a brief declaration that Intact has a duty to defend. The appellants submit that the application judge’s brief reasons do not permit meaningful appellate review.

 

Issues:

Do the application judge’s brief reasons permit meaningful appellate review?

Holding: Appeal allowed.

Reasoning:

No. The application judge’s reasons are inadequate and do not permit meaningful appellate review.

In his brief reasons, the application judge did not conduct the necessary analysis of the pleadings, maintenance contract and policies, which were essential in this complex case, to address the coverage issue.

While the application judge’s reasons advert to the relevant principles, he did not engage in any analysis of the critical issues that had to be addressed and resolved in the present case.

The Court was also concerned that it did not have the benefit of full argument on all matters that are relevant to the disposition of the application. As a result, the Court allowed the appeal and remitted the application for a new hearing before a different judge.

Farley v. Ottawa (Police Services Board), 2017 ONCA 689

[Watt, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A]

Counsel:

Diane Condo, for the appellant

Stuart Zacharias, for the respondent
Keywords: Torts, Malicious Prosecution, Negligent Investigation, Constitutional Law, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Reasonable and Probable Grounds, Miazga v. Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51, Summary Judgment

Facts:

The plaintiff appealed a decision granting the Ottawa Police Services Board summary judgment dismissing his action, in which he claimed damages for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation and breach of Charter rights. These claims arose following an investigation conducted by the Ottawa Police which resulted in the appellant’s arrest on charges of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and possession of explosives with the intent to cause bodily harm or death. The appellant was found guilty by a jury, but successfully appealed the decision on the basis of misdirection and misreception of hearsay evidence, resulting in a new trial being ordered. The second trial took place several years later, but two of the Crown’s key witnesses were unavailable. The trial judge determined that the Crown’s evidentiary problems were too significant, and consequently acquitted the appellant. The appellant then commenced proceedings against the Ottawa Police Services Board.

On the motion for summary motion brought by the Ottawa Police Services Board, the motion judge found that there was no evidence of malicious prosecution or evidence that the investigation fell below a standard of reasonable care. There was also no evidence of negligence, and no basis for a Charter infringement claim. Therefore, the motion judge found that there was no issue requiring trial, and the summary judgment motion was granted.

 

Issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err by weighing evidence and drawing inferences that were beyond his authority on the motion for summary judgment?

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

(1) No. Critical to the appellant’s action is the assertion that the police did not have reasonable and probable grounds upon which to believe the appellant committed the alleged offences. Counsel for the appellant conceded committal for trial at the conclusion of the preliminary inquiry, and the prosecution would likely have continued if not for the Crown’s evidentiary issues. The Court held that this demonstrated that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the criminal prosecution, citing Miazga v. Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51. Therefore, the appellant had no prospect of success at trial, and the motion for summary judgment was properly granted.

< a name= “08094” Novak v. St. Demetrius (Ukrainian Catholic) Development, 2017 ONCA 693

[Epstein J.A. (In Chambers)]

 

Counsel:

S Novak, acting in person

M Wiffen, duty counsel

N Brankley, for St. Demetrius Ukrainian Catholic Development Corporation and Ukrainian Canadian Care Centre (collectively, the respondents)

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Security for Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61.06(1)(a), York University v. Markicevic, 2017 ONCA 651

Facts:

The appellant, Ms Novak, issued a statement of claim alleging that the respondents wrongfully denied her a full-time position at the Ukrainian Catholic Care Centre (“UCCC”). The action was dismissed after a trial by Diamond J. The trial judge found Ms. Novak’s claim to be statute-barred and further held that Ms. Novak had failed to prove her claim on the merits. After serving a notice of appeal, Ms. Novak was ordered to pay the costs of the trial.

The respondents seek an order for security for costs under r. 61.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure that allows a judge to order security for costs in an appeal where it appears that there is good reason to believe that the appeal is frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant has insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the appeal. The respondents argue that there is good reason to believe that Ms. Novak’s proposed appeal is both frivolous and vexatious. To succeed in her appeal, Ms. Novak would have to prove that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error not only in concluding that she commenced the action out of time but also that she failed to prove her case on the merits.

Issue:

Should the court exercise its discretion to order security for costs?

Holding:

Motion granted.

Reasoning:

Yes. Ms. Novak pointed to no evidence that would support a finding that the limitation period may not have begun to run after June 2009 when the union advised all parties that it would not be taking any further action regarding Ms. Novak’s grievance. This fact was sufficient to support a finding that Ms. Novak’s appeal is frivolous. In addition, the trial judge’s findings of fact in support of her conclusions on the merits, particularly that there was no evidence to support the essential argument that Ms. Novak was ever promised a full-time position with the UCCC, were supported by the record.

Citing York University v. Markicevic, 2017 ONCA 651, at para. 35, “an appeal that appears to rise even to the level of “low prospect of success” or “unlikely to succeed” is not “frivolous and vexatious”. To find that an appeal is “frivolous and vexatious” there must be something that supports the conclusion that the appeal is “vexatious” in order for security for costs to be available under r. 61.06(1)(a)”. In concluding that there is good reason to believe that Ms. Novak’s appeal is vexatious, the Court referred to Ms. Novak’s conduct in the appeal, including an email that Ms. Novak sent to respondents’ counsel in which she refers to the court system as a “circus”.

Lastly, on the basis of the evidence of the respondents and of Ms. Novak herself, the Court concluded that there is good reason to believe that Ms. Novak has insufficient assets to pay the costs of the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay $20,000 into court as security for the costs of the appeal.

< a name =”08095″>Daniel v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, LLP, 2017 ONCA 697

[Strathy C.J.O., van Rensburg and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Robert G. Matlack, for the appellant

Myron W. Shulgan and Nicole Marcus, for the respondent

Keywords: Employment Law, Wrongful Dismissal, Partnerships, Law Firms, McCormick v. Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, 2014 SCC 39, Standard of Review, Mixed Fact and Law, Palpable and Overriding Error

Facts:

(Taken from the lower court decision) The appellant was a partner in a law firm that, by early January, 2014, had dissolved. The lawyers and staff of the dissolved firm had relocated either to the Windsor firm of Shibley, Righton or to a reconstituted version of the firm organized by three members of the firm under its original name.

The appellant was not offered a comparable position or remuneration at the Shibley, Righton firm or any position at the reconstituted firm, nor was she offered a severance package by her firm before its dissolution.  The appellant took the position at trial that she was an employee and that in these circumstances the termination of her employment amounted to a constructive dismissal, without notice.  She argued that in these circumstances, she was entitled to damages for wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge dismissed her claim, finding that she was a partner for, among other, the following reasons:

  • She conducted herself as a partner, was treated as a partner and was held out to clients, the Law Society and Canada Revenue Agency as a partner;
  • She received a draw, without source deductions of income tax or employment insurance, and filed her tax returns as a partner;
  • She made contributions to a capital account, which were recorded in the financial statements, and was at risk that her capital contributions could be lost;
  • She received enhanced benefits and insurance, which were available only to partners in the firm;
  • She attended partners’ meetings at which decisions were made, participated in the management of the firm and, contrary to her evidence, was entitled to vote on decisions made at partners’ meetings;
  • She had access to confidential information, which was only available to partners, about the business and financial affairs of the firm;
  • She signed firm cheques and opinions on behalf of the firm;
  • She shared in the profits of the firm through a bonus dependent on the profit of the firm; and
  • She had “built up a not insignificant practice of her own.”

The appellant’s core submission on appeal was that in finding that she was a partner in the respondent law firm, rather than an employee, the trial judge gave insufficient consideration to the fact that her work was controlled by the partner whose clients she served and that she was dependent on the firm for her work. In so doing, she says, the trial judge failed to apply the test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in McCormick v. Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, 2014 SCC 39, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 108.

Issues:

1) Did the trial judge err in finding that a partnership relationship existed?

2) Did the trial judge fail to apply the test set out by the SCC in McCormick v. Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP?

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

1) No. The trial judge applied the relevant legal principles to his findings of fact and concluded that a partnership relationship existed in the context of the factual matrix in the case. This was a conclusion of mixed fact and law and the appellant has demonstrated no palpable and overriding error. In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge accepted the evidence of two other members of the firm, whose circumstances were similar to the appellant’s, who testified that they conducted themselves as partners in the firm and were treated as such.

2) No. McCormick, to which the trial judge adverted, dealt with the issue of whether a mandatory retirement provision in a law firm’s partnership agreement offended the Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210. The control and dependency test was applied to determine whether a particular workplace relationship placed a person in a position of vulnerability for the purpose of the Code. McCormick does not establish control and dependency as an all-purpose test to determine whether a person is a partner or an employee. Here, the trial judge correctly concluded that one must examine all the surrounding circumstances, the substance of the relationship, the behaviour of the parties and the intention of the parties, in order to determine whether a partnership exists.

Lin v. Fleury, 2017 ONCA 695

[Watt, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

K Lin, Acting in person

G Tanner. for the respondent

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Jurisdiction, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule  2.1(01)(1)

Facts:

The appellant had issued a claim against the respondents seeking damages for $50,000 from Fleury and $300,000 from Ann. The cause of action was unclear. The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action with costs. The appellant then filed a notice of appeal in the Divisional Court. The Divisional Court quashed the appeal after being satisfied that the amounts involved exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of that court.

By Notice of Motion, the appellant sought leave to appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal from the decision of the Divisional Court. The respondents invoked r. 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that it is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process.

Issues:

  1. Is the appellant’s leave to appeal frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court?
  2. Did the Divisional Court err in finding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s appeal because the amounts claimed exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of that court?

Holding: Motion for leave to appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

  1. Yes. The court was satisfied that the motion for leave to appeal is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court.
  2. No. The Divisional Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s appeal because the amounts claimed exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of that court. The motion for leave is dismissed under r.2.1.01(1).

Criminal Decisions

R v Ellacott 2017 ONCA 680

[Weiler, Feldman and Huscroft JJ.A]

Counsel:

E Dann, for the appellant

G Macdonald, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, First Degree Murder, Sentencing, Criminal Code, s. 745.1(a), Youth Criminal Justice Act, Moral Blameworthiness, R. v. D.B 2008 SCC 25, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3, R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, R. v. Grant, 2016 ONCA 639, 351 O.A.C. 345, R. v. W.(M.), 2017 ONCA 22, 134 O.R. (3d) 1,   Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, R. v. Bradley, 2008 ONCA 179, 234 O.A.C. 363 , Principles of Rehabilitation and Integration, R. v. O.(A.), 2007 ONCA 144

 

R v Prohaska (Publication Ban) 2017 ONCA 681

[Watt, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A]

Counsel:

F Miller, for the appellant

R De Filippis, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Assault, Sexual Assault, Sexual Interference, Criminal Code, s. 265(1)(a)

R v Sangs 2017 ONCA 683

[Watt, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A]

Counsel:

F Bernhardt, for the appellant

G Zaman, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Trafficking, Immigration Law, Permanent Residency, Immigration and Refugee Board,  Immigration Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 36(1)(a) and 64

 

R v Tadesse 2017 ONCA 682 

[Watt, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A]

Counsel:

H Pringle, for the appellant

J Epstein, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Carrying a Concealed Weapon, Criminal Code, ss. 90(2), 469, 553 and 536(2) , Jurisdiction, Ontario Court of Justice, Election of Mode of Trial, R. v. Vuong, 2010 ONCA 798

R v LS(Publication Ban) 2017 ONCA 685

[Doherty, Huscroft and Miller JJ.A]

Counsel:

A Menchynski and J Marshman, for the appellant

E Siebenmorgen for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Assault, Mistaken Belief in Consent, Evidence, Prior Sexual History, Prior Statements, Credibility, R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, Criminal Code ss.273.2(b), 276, 276.1 and 276.2, R. v. Davis, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 759, R. v. Harris, [1997] O.J. No. 3560, R. v. S. (P.) (2007), 221 C.C.C. (3d) 45, Jury Instructions, R. v. C. (A.R.), [2002] O.J. No. 5364 (Sup. Ct.), R. v. B. (B.), [2009] O.J. No. 862 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), SentencingR. v. Ghadban, 2015 ONCA 760

R v Mohammed 2017 ONCA 691

[Watt, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A]

Counsel:

K Bailey, for the appellant

A Cappell for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession of a Prohibited Firearm, Possession of Marijuana, Trafficking, Sentencing

R v Simard 2017 ONCA 690

[Watt, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A]

Counsel:

GD Cudmore and P Douglas, for the appellant

J Patton  for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Attempted Murder, Unlawful Confinement, Uttering Death Threats, Assaulting a Police Officer, Not Criminally Responsible by Reason of Mental Disorder, Sentencing

R v Stevens 2017 ONCA 686

[Watt, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A]

Counsel:

L Gunn, for the appellant

A Hrybinsky for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Impaired Operation of a Motor Vehicle Causing Death, Dangerous Operation of a Motor Vehicle Causing Death, Sentencing

R v Brown 2017 ONCA 694

[ Watt, Epstein and Brown JJ.A]

Counsel:

J Abou-Eid, for the appellant

K Beaudoin, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Circumstantial Evidence, Standard of Proof

R v Picard (Publication Ban) 2017 ONCA 692

[ Doherty, Rouleau and Pepall JJ.A]

Counsel:

R Pinnock and T Kozlowski, for the appellant

H L Krongold, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, First Degree Murder, Unreasonable Delay, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b), R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, Defence Delay, Exceptional Circumstances, Complexity, R. v. Coulter, 2016 ONCA 704, 133 O.R. (3d) 433, R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, Transitional Exceptional Circumstances, R. v. Manasseri, 2016 ONCA 703, 132 O.R. (3d) 401, leave to appeal refused, [2016] S.C.C.A. 513, R. v. Williamson, 2016 SCC 28, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 741, Institutional Delay, R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, Crown Delay

R v Loor 2017 ONCA 696

[Laskin, Simmons and Pardu JJ.A]

Counsel:

M A Moon and L Gensey, for the appellant

A Martin, for the respondent

Keywords:  Criminal Law, Drug Trafficking, Evidence, Circumstantial Evidence, R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, Sentencing, Proportionality,  R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Civil Endorsements

Slongo v Slongo 2017 ONCA 687

[ Simmons, LaForme and Pardu JJ.A]

Counsel:

P C Buttigieg and R A Fernandes, for the appellant

H I Fogelman and EL Chaiton-Murray, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Costs, Offers to Settle, Spousal Support, Child Support

Bruff-Murphy v Gunawardena 2017 ONCA 698

[Lauwers, Hourigan and Bennoto JJ.A]

Counsel:

G D E Adair, for the appellants

D I Reisler and J L Kuredjian, for the respondent

Keywords: Costs Endorsement

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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