COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (MARCH 20 – 24, 2017)

Good evening:

Following are the summaries for this week’s civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario. In York (Regional Municipality) v. Tsui, the Court concluded that municipal by-laws that circumscribe the hours of operation of body rub parlours are not criminal laws and therefore not ultra vires. In Chapman v. GPM Investment Management, the Court found that an employer’s refusal to pay out a significant bonus because it interpreted the bonus provision in the employment agreement differently from the employee did not constitute constructive dismissal, even though the refusal to pay the bonus turned out to be in breach of the employment agreement. In Scaduto v Cucu, the Court considered whether to grant amicus curiae status to a party that had been adverse in interest in previous proceedings.

Have a great weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos

Blaney McMurtry LLP

jpolyzogopoulos@blaney.com

Tel: 416 593 2953

http://www.blaney.com/lawyers/john-polyzogopoulos

Table of Contents:

 

Civil Decisions:

Chapman v. GPM Investment Management, 2017 ONCA 227

Keywords: Employment Law, Constructive Dismissal, Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission, 2015 SCC 10, Potter test

York (Regional Municipality) v. Tsui, 2017 ONCA 230

Keywords: Municipal Law, Bylaw Enforcement, Constitutional Law, Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91 or 92, Division of Powers, Vires, Pith and Substance, Property and Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Cardenas v. Toronto (City), 2017 ONCA 237

Keywords: Endorsement, Civil Procedure, Service of Documents, Personal Service, Validating Service, Dispensing With Service, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 16.04 and 16.08

Scaduto v Cucu, 2017 ONCA 224

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Intervention, Friend of the Court, Amicus Curiae, Rule 13.02

Schulstad v Schulstad, 2017 ONCA 246

Keywords: Endorsement, Costs

Lixo Investments Limited v. FCHT Holdings (Ontario) Corporation, 2017 ONCA 239

Keywords: Endorsement, Real Property

For a list of short civil endorsements, click here.

For a list of criminal decisions, click here.

Civil Decisions:

Chapman v. GPM Investment Management, 2017 ONCA 227

[van Rensburg, Hourigan and Miller JJ.A]

Counsel:

P. J. Pape and J. R. Morse, for the appellan

C.J. Cosgriffe and R. Watkins, for the respondents

Keywords: Employment Law, Constructive Dismissal, Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission, 2015 SCC 10, Potter test

Facts:

GPM was in the business of providing real estate management services. The appellant was employed by GPM for nine years as its chief executive officer and president, and was also a director of IAM, which holds an ownership interest in GPM. Over the course of his employment, the appellant entered into three successive memoranda of understanding, setting out the terms of employment. The most recent of these, dated November 17, 2008, was for a term of three years and was in force at the time the appellant’s employment ended on October 26, 2011. This memorandum of understanding provided that the appellant was entitled, in addition to his base salary and various benefits and stock options, to an annual bonus.

On October 19, 2011, the appellant met with Steven Johnson, the Chief Financial Officer of the respondent IAM, to discuss the amount of his 2011 bonus. The appellant was surprised to learn that GPM planned to exclude from the calculation of its pretax income (which was used to calculate the appellant’s bonus) profit from the sale of lands that it had purchased several years earlier as an investment (the “Ellerslie lands”). The exclusion of profits from the sale of the Ellerslie lands reduced the appellant’s bonus by $329,687. Johnson and the appellant met again on October 24, 2011, and Johnson confirmed this decision. He left open the possibility, however, that GPM might reconsider if the other investors in the Ellerslie lands would be willing to contribute. The appellant did not follow up on this suggestion, on the basis that the other investors had no legal obligation to contribute to his bonus.

On October 26, 2011, the appellant left his employment, after taking the position that GPM’s refusal to include the profit from the sale of the Ellerslie lands in the calculation of his bonus constituted constructive dismissal. GPM took the position that he had voluntarily resigned. The appellant sued for damages for breach of his employment contract and for constructive dismissal. The respondents defended the action, asserting that no bonus was payable on the Ellerslie lands and that the appellant had not been constructively dismissed.

Although the trial judge found that GPM had breached the appellant’s contract by not including the profit from the Ellerslie lands transaction in the calculation of the appellant’s bonus, he did not find that the appellant had been constructively dismissed. The trial judge found that the breach did not alter an essential term of the appellant’s contract. He characterized the dispute between the parties as more a matter of “disagreement over the interpretation of the application of Mr. Chapman’s bonus scheme”. This was not, therefore, a unilateral change in the bonus structure by the employer, but a disagreement over the interpretation of the contract, and a “disagreement regarding the calculation of a bonus is not necessarily constructive dismissal”. The trial judge concluded that “[a]ny reasonable person would conclude that the essential terms of the employment contract had not been changed, but in fact remained intact.”

Issue:

  1. Did the trial judge misapply the test for constructive dismissal?
  2. If so, should the damages for constructive dismissal be assessed on the basis of a four-year average of pre-dismissal remuneration?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:
1. No.  As the trial judge noted, there are two routes that a plaintiff can follow to establish constructive dismissal, as set out in Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission. The first branch is apt where an employer has, by a single unilateral act, breached an essential term of the contract of employment. The second branch allows for constructive dismissal to be made out where there has been “a series of acts that, taken together, show that the employer no longer intended to be bound by the contract”. On both branches, it is “the employer’s perceived intention no longer to be bound by the contract” that gives rise to the constructive dismissal.

The appellant made arguments under each branch of Potter. First, he argued that the trial judge muddled the two branches of Potter and imported elements of the second branch into the first. Additionally, he argued that the trial judge impermissibly relied on the employer’s perspective rather than the employee’s. With respect to the second branch, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in not considering the second branch of the Potter test at all, and ought to have found constructive dismissal based on GPM’s course of conduct.

With respect to the first branch of Potter, the Court of Appeal determined that the trial judge made no error in characterizing the dispute as solely about whether a particular transaction – one that he accepted could not be repeated during the remainder of the contractual term – fit within the unaltered bonus structure. The trial judge’s rejection of the appellant’s argument that the respondents had converted the appellant’s bonus structure from nondiscretionary to discretionary, and his finding that the disagreement over what constituted income for the calculation of the appellant’s bonus was not an alteration to the contract, let alone a substantial alteration, were supported by the evidence. Finally, the conclusion that the failure to pay the bonus in question did not constitute constructive dismissal, notwithstanding that non-payment was in breach of the appellant’s employment contract, was reasonably open to the trial judge after a proper analysis and application of the first branch of the Potter test.

A further argument on appeal is that the trial judge failed to address the second branch of Potter, specifically the argument that the respondents unequivocally told the appellant that they would not be bound by the contract, and that this was a continuing course of conduct that evidenced an intention not to be bound by the contract in the future. The respondents objected that this theory of liability was neither pleaded nor advanced at trial, and so it was unsurprising that it was not featured more prominently in the trial judge’s reasons.

In any event, the argument failed on the facts, as found by the trial judge: “no evidence was presented upon which one could conclude that GPM did not intend to be bound by the terms of the 2008 employment Memorandum of Understanding.” None of the evidence that the appellant marshalled in support of the argument that the respondents resented the appellant’s level of remuneration and intended to curtail it when his contract was next up for renegotiation, is relevant to the question of whether a reasonable employee in the circumstances of the appellant would believe that the respondents did not intend to be bound to the existing agreement. And against this is, the appellant’s own evidence that he believed at the relevant time that despite GPM refusing to pay a portion of his bonus, nothing had changed going forward. In such circumstances, constructive dismissal is not made out on the second branch either.

2. N/A. Since the trial judge did not err in his application of the law of constructive dismissal, it was not necessary to address the second issue.

York (Regional Municipality) v. Tsui, 2017 ONCA 230

[Doherty, Pepall and Hourigan JJ.A.]

C. G. Bendick, for the appellant

A.N. Young, for the respondent

D. Huffaker, for the intervener, the Attorney General of Ontario

Keywords: Municipal Law, Bylaw Enforcement, Constitutional Law, Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91 or 92, Division of Powers, Vires, Pith and Substance, Property and Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Facts:

The respondent Tsui owned and operated a “body rub parlour” in Vaughan. He was charged with contravening the section of by-Law 315-2005 that governs operating hours. Tsui challenged the by-law on the basis that it was unconstitutional, because it constituted criminal law and was therefore outside of the municipality’s jurisdiction. Specifically, Tsui submitted that the by-law’s provisions governing dress were a prohibition against nudity, and the hours of operation provision was a prohibition against prostitution. The Attorney General of Ontario intervened in the appeal to challenge the Ontario Court of Justice’s treatment of the scope of the provincial power to legislate to suppress conditions conducive to crime.

Tsui was charged with contravening s. 13.0(1)(h) of the 2005 by-law, which provides that parlours may only operate from 9:00 am to 10:00 pm on weekdays, from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm on Saturday and from 10:00 am to 5:00 pm on Sunday. Tsui was charged with permitting a body rub parlour to be open outside permitted times on July 8, 2012. The certificate of offence stated that the fine was $400.

Tsui brought an application before a Justice of the Peace requesting that all of s.13 or, in the alternative, ss.13.0(1)(h) and 13.4 be declared invalid on the basis that the pith and substance of the provisions is criminal in scope and therefore ultra vires the municipality’s legislative competence. The Justice of the Peace quashed the sections dealing with hours of operation and dress, even though Tsui was not charged with contravention of the dress provisions. An appeal by the City from that decision to the Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ) was dismissed. The City appealed to the OCA.

Issues:

1) Did the OCJ appeal judge err in his consideration of the “pith and substance” of the by-law by focusing exclusively on the extrinsic evidence and failing to engage in the exercise of characterizing the purpose and effect of the provision of the by-law as it was enacted?

2) Did the OCJ appeal judge err by failing to give proper scope to the municipal objective of legislating to suppress conditions likely to produce crime?

3) Did the OCJ appeal judge err by holding that, in legislating conditions to suppress crime, a municipality cannot target a specific crime but must aim at crime in general?

Holding:

Appeal allowed, new trial ordered.

Reasoning:

1) Yes. The lower courts ignored significant intrinsic evidence and misapprehended the evidence, as they failed to examine and characterize the purpose of the by-law and misstated the legal effect of the by-law provision in issue.

To determine the “matter” of the legislation in issue, the purpose of the enacting body and the legal effect of the law must be examined. Once the pith and substance has been identified, the matter must be assigned to a head of power under ss. 91 or 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Overlapping powers are often unavoidable, and so long as they do not conflict, they will both be deemed to be valid. The Municipal Act 2001 provided express power to local municipalities to pass by-laws for the purpose of regulating body rub parlours. Therefore, the City had authority to regulate closing times and to establish fines for transgression of the by-law.

To constitute criminal law, the impugned enactment requires a prohibition and a penal consequence, and the prohibition must serve a “criminal public purpose”. At the time of the hearing, prostitution was not illegal, but the Criminal Code did address nudity.

The Court agreed with the City’s submissions, finding that the pith and substance of the hours of operation provision is business licensing, and that the courts below erred in failing to consider relevant intrinsic evidence, in considering irrelevant extrinsic evidence, and in failing to consider the legal effect of the provision in issue. The Justice of the Peace erred in failing to discuss the preamble of the by-law, which identifies the licensing and regulatory purpose that underlies the enactment.

2) Yes. The OCJ appeal judge erred by failing to give proper scope to the municipal objective of business licensing and legislating to suppress conditions likely to produce crime. A province may enact measures to deter criminality provided they are taken in relation to a head of provincial competence. The by-law is anchored in the province’s authority over property, civil rights, and licenses. The by-law subject matter related to business licensing, so it was open to the municipality to enact a by-law that served to suppress conditions conducive to crime. There was evidence to support the perception of nuisance. Governments have a responsibility towards their citizens, and here the City was acting to protect its citizens from nuisance in the community. Finally, the dominant purpose of the provisions did not amount to criminal law.

3) Yes. The jurisprudence does not reflect the position of the OCJ appeal judge that a municipality, in the exercise of provincially delegated authority, is limited to legislating to suppress conditions that are conducive to crime in general. Where the pith and substance of the legislation comes under a head of provincial authority, it may also aim to suppress conditions conducive to crime, even if those conditions relate to a specific Criminal Code offence. The OCJ appeal judge improperly narrowed the scope of provincial authority to legislate to suppress conditions conducive to crime.

Cardenas v. Toronto (City), 2017 ONCA 237

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Gillese and Brown JJ.A]

Counsel:

T. J. McCarthy and J. J. Rioux, for the appellant
D. Bierstone, for the respondents

Keywords: Endorsement, Civil Procedure, Service of Documents, Personal Service, Validating Service, Dispensing With Service, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 16.04 and 16.08

Facts:

In June 2008, the plaintiff, seven-year old David Cardenas, was struck when riding his bicycle on Neames Crescent, Toronto, by a car driven by the appellant, Eugenio Sallese. An action was commenced by the Cardenas family in February 2012.

Rosa Cavallo and her husband, Francesco, owned a house on Neames Crescent. In June 2012, Sallese issued a Third Party Claim against Rosa Cavallo and the estate of her late husband, alleging that foliage on their property had created a hazard to motorists driving on the street where young David was struck.

Acting under the mistaken belief that the Third Party Claim had been served on the Cavallos, their insurer, Economical Insurance, filed a defence to the Third Party Claim in March 2013. When the insurer realized its mistake, it moved to set aside the defence in 2014. By that time, Rosa had sold the house and moved to Italy. Her exact whereabouts were unknown.

By order dated June 19, 2014, B. O’Marra J. set aside the defence and permitted Sallese six-months to attempt personal service of the Third Party Claim on Rosa.

About two years later, in June 2016, Sallese moved for an order seeking an extension of time for service of the Third Party Claim on Rosa nunc pro tunc, together with an order validating service of the pleading on Rosa on the basis the pleading had come to her attention. The motion was supported by hearsay evidence describing the attempts that had been made to locate and serve Rosa.

The motion judge dismissed the motion. He decided he was not satisfied that the statement of claim has come to the attention of Rosa Cavallo. The motion judge also refused to dispense with personal service on Rosa. Sallese appealed.

Issue:

Did the motion judge err in refusing to validate service or dispense with service?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

The motion judge did not err in reaching his decision. First, there is no basis for appellate interference with the motion judge’s refusal to validate service on Rosa. The affidavit filed by Sallese on the motion did not identify the source of key facts and contained second and third hand hearsay. The requirements of r. 39.01(4) are clear, and Sallese did not adduce any evidence to support an argument that necessity required the admission of impermissible hearsay evidence.

Second, the motion judge did not err by failing to give effect to an oral undertaking given by his counsel that Sallese would limit the amount of his Third Party Claim against Rosa to the limits of her insurance policy. Though Sallese’s counsel did give an oral undertaking, that was not the appropriate way in which to provide a formal undertaking to the court. Such an undertaking should be reduced to writing, preferably by way of an affidavit or, at a minimum, should be included in the recitals to the resulting order. In any event, the Court was not persuaded that in the circumstances of this case the motion judge was required to conclude such an undertaking was sufficient, in itself, to dispense with service.

Scaduto v Cucu, 2017 ONCA 224

[Epstein, Benotto and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G. Scaduto, acting in person

L. Cucu, acting in person

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Intervention, Friend of the Court, Amicus Curiae, Rule 13.02

Facts:                                                 

The appellants, Maria Scaduto and Guiliano Scaduto, objected to the operation of a restaurant at a property neighbouring theirs. The respondent, Liviu Cucu, owns the neighbouring property and formerly operated the restaurant. The Scadutos argued that the property was not zoned for commercial use and that Toronto acted improperly in allowing a building permit for the conversion of the property from a garage into a restaurant. Ms. Scaduto sued Cucu and Toronto in Small Claims Court. Her claim was dismissed as statute-barred. Her appeal to the Divisional Court was dismissed. Scaduto attempted to appeal to the Court of Appeal but filed out of time and was unsuccessful in obtaining an extension. In 2015, Scaduto and her son again sued in Small Claims Court, this time only against Toronto. The claim was dismissed.

In the proceeding appealed to the Court of Appeal, the appellants sought an injunction against Cucu. Toronto is not a party. Counsel for Toronto was present on the return of the application and sought to make submissions. Guiliano Scaduto objected to counsel for Toronto being allowed to speak. The application judge appointed counsel for Toronto as amicus curiae to help the court with the history and the materials. The application judge found that Guiliano Scaduto’s view that the use of the property as a restaurant was illegal was incorrect.

The Scadutos argued that the application judge erred in relying on Joseph Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2014 ONSC 6026 (Div Ct) in granting Toronto amicus curiae status. They submitted that in Groia, the party that was allowed to be amicus curiae was neutral but here Toronto had been an adverse party in the two previous proceedings in Small Claims Court and at the appeal in Divisional Court. They requested that the matter be remitted to the Superior Court to be reconsidered by a different judge, without Toronto as amicus.

Issue:

Whether the application judge erred in granting Toronto amicus curiae status.

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

Pursuant to R. 13.02, any person, may with leave of a judge or at the invitation of the presiding judge or master, and without becoming a party to the proceeding, intervene as a friend of the court for the purpose of rendering assistance to the court by way of argument. In Oakwell Engineering LTd v EnerNorth Industries Inc, 2006 CarswellOnt 9793 (CA) at para 9, McMurtry CJO noted that an amicus need not be “impartial”, “objective” or “disinterested” in the outcome of a case. The fact that the position of a proposed intervener is generally aligned with the position of one of the parties is not a bar to intervention if the intervener can make a useful contribution to the analysis of the issues before the court.

It was proper for the application judge to allow Toronto to make submissions. Toronto was able to make a useful contribution to the resolution of the case without causing injustice to the Scadutos. Moreover, Toronto’s ability to assist the court was the result of the Scadutos’ having informed the City that it was to be added as a party.

It was also clear that there was no merit to the underlying zoning issue in the appeal. Even if the application judge erred in allowing Toronto to make submissions as amicus, the error did not affect the outcome.

Schulstad v Schulstad, 2017 ONCA 246

[Weiler, Rouleau and Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P. MacEachern, for the appellant

R. Paritzky, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Costs

Facts:

The Court of Appeal had allowed in part the appellant’s appeal from an order of the application judge, and directed that the amount of spousal support and insurance benefits, if any, be sent back for determination by another application judge. At issue were the costs of the appeal and of the application below. The application judge had granted the respondent as the successful party on the application, his partial indemnity costs.

The appellant submitted the costs order of the application judge should be set aside, arguing that the respondent’s failure to disclose relevant financial information additionally justified her receiving costs on the application below. The appellant sought her partial indemnity costs of the appeal. In total, the appellant asked for costs in the amount of $34,555. The respondent maintained that he achieved the greater success relative to the appellant and should be awarded costs, on the basis that the appellant opposed any reduction to spousal support or insurance benefits on the application below; the reduction to monthly spousal support was significant and any further adjustment would likely be modest; the respondent gained the ability to deduct the costs of life insurance premiums from the support. He submitted that the award of costs to him on the application below should not be disturbed and that he should have his costs on the appeal in the further amount of $15,000. In total, the respondent sought costs in the amount of $30,000.

Issue:

Whether the application judge’s costs order should be set aside.

Holding:

Costs order set aside.

Reasoning:

When an appeal is allowed, the general principle is that the order for costs below is set aside and costs are awarded to the successful party on a partial indemnity basis. The Court of Appeal has discretion to depart from this approach “in unusual circumstances”: Kipij v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) (1999), 85 ACWS (3d) 763 (Ont CA); Hunt v TD Securities Inc (2003), 43 CPC (5th) 211 (Ont CA).

Whether the respondent’s spousal support and insurance obligations should be terminated or reduced was the main issue on the application below and on the appeal. That the appropriate reduction to the respondent’s obligations remains open for determination by another application judge constitutes the kind of “unusual circumstances” that supports a departure from the general principle that the successful party on appeal be granted the costs on the proceeding below.

While the Court of Appeal set aside the application judge’s costs order, the costs of the application below and of any further application to determine the final reduced amount of spousal support and insurance benefits are reserved to the application judge. The Court noted that this is the fairest approach for the parties as the application judge will be in the best position to assess the relative success of the parties’ positions on the application and to take into account the significance of any offers to settle.

The appellant was entitled to her costs on appeal. She largely prevailed on the main issue, namely whether spousal support and insurance benefits should be terminated or reduced, although she did take the position that there should be no reduction to the original support order.

Lixo Investments Limited v. FCHT Holdings (Ontario) Corporation, 2017 ONCA 239

[Rouleau, Pepall and Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P.P. E. Du Vernet, for the appellant

M. Reynolds and E. Che, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Real Property

Facts: The respondent acquired 86 Yorkville Avenue several months after a fire originating in the building caused extensive damage to the property and to the appellant’s adjoining property at 84 Yorkville Avenue. The properties are semi-detached and share a common dividing wall. The appellant brought an application seeking various relief, including recovery of losses suffered as a result of the fire and subsequent conduct of the respondent and its predecessor in title that impaired the appellant’s ability to use its property.

Issue:

Did the application judge err in concluding that the respondent did not become liable for the damages allegedly caused to the appellant prior to the respondent’s purchase of 86 Yorkville Avenue?

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

No. The application judge did not commit a reversible error. The respondent had no involvement in and cannot be responsible for the appellant’s damages accrued before the respondent acquired 86 Yorkville Avenue. As acknowledged by the respondent, the application judge’s decision does not prevent the appellant from proceeding with its claims against the respondent for any damages suffered by the appellant during the period of the respondent’s ownership of the property that are caused by the respondent’s tortious conduct.

Civil Endorsements:

Kent v. Chin and Orr Lawyers, 2017 ONCA 223

[Epstein, Benotto and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P. Kent, acting in person

S. Lucenti, for the respondents, Chin and Orr Lawyer

A. Melfi, for the respondent, Alousis Law Professional Corporation

Keywords: Endorsement, Interlocutory Orders, Hendrickson v. Kallio

Tamanovski Estate v. Georgieva, 2017 ONCA 225

[Epstein, Benotto and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

V. Georgieva, acting in person

E. Haziri, acting in person

D. Haziri, acting in person

Keywords: Endorsement, Estates, Will, Common Law Spouse, Fresh Evidence

Criminal Decisions:

R. v. Atwal, 2017 ONCA 228

[Feldman, van Rensburg and Pardu JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Boggs, for the appellant

S. Ficek, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Fraud, Forgery, Sentencing

 R. v. Hess, 2017 ONCA 220

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Doherty and Miller JJ.A.]

Counsel:

L. Joyal and Jennifer Crawford, for the appellant

E. Dann, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Dangerous Offenders, Sentencing, Release Plan, R. v. McCallum 

R. v. Dwyer, 2017 ONCA 238

[Doherty, Huscroft and Miller JJ.A.]

Counsel:

B. Vandebeek, for the appellant

S. Aujla, for the respondent

[Doherty, Huscroft and Miller JJ.A.]

Keywords: Criminal Law, Endorsement, Evidence, Good Character

R. v. Athwal, 2017 ONCA 222

[MacPherson, Juriansz and Rouleau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Gurvinder Athwal, acting in person

[B. Snell, appearing as duty counsel

R. Visca, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Conspiracy, Possession, Drug Trafficking, Jury Instructions

R. v. Deol, 2017 ONCA 221

[MacPherson, Juriansz and Rouleau JJ.A.]

A. Gold, for the appellant

R. Visca, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Conspiracy, Possession, Drug Trafficking, Jury Instructions

R. v. Manasseri, 2017 ONCA 226

[Watt J.A. (In Chambers)]

p. Campbell, for the applicant

S. D. Porter, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Second Degree Murder, Bail, Release and Recognizance

R. v. Wilson, 2017 ONCA 229

[Epstein J.A. (In Chambers)]

A. Rice, for the applicant

T. Wilson and C. Gould, acting in person

Keywords: Criminal Law, Fraud, Money Laundering, Bail, Extradition

 R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., 2017 ONCA 231

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Doherty and Miller JJ.A.]

I. MacKinnon, for the appellants

B. Puddington and S. Shaikh, for the respondent

S. Magotiaux, for the intervener, the Attorney General of Ontario

A. MacDonald, for the intervener, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association

B. Radnoff and C. Shorey, for the intervener, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association

J. Safayeni, for the intervener, Coalition of media and journalist organizations

Keywords: Criminal Law, Freedom of the Press, Production Orders, Sealing Orders, Non-Publication Orders, Criminal Code, s. 487.014, Certiorari

R. v. Graham, 2017 ONCA 245

[Feldman, van Rensburg and Pardu JJ.A.]

R. Litkowski, for the appellant

S. Selvaratnam, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Endorsement, Possession, Drug Trafficking, Sentencing

R. v. Green, 2017 ONCA 244

[Feldman, van Rensburg and Pardu JJ.A.]

L. Beechener, for the appellant

K. Rawluk, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Endorsement, Bail, Sentencing

 

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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