COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (MARCH 6-MARCH 10, 2017)

Good evening:

Following are the summaries for this week’s civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario. There were not many substantive decisions and of those, none were particularly noteworthy. Topics covered included family law, conflict of laws (choice of law), MVA, jury charges and reasonable apprehension of bias.

Wishing everyone who is taking one, a nice March break.

John Polyzogopoulos

Blaney McMurtry LLP

jpolyzogopoulos@blaney.com

Tel: 416 593 2953

http://www.blaney.com/lawyers/john-polyzogopoulos

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions (click on case name to read summary) 

Norman v. van Meppelen Scheppink, 2017 ONCA 192

Keywords: Endorsement, Torts, MVA, Charge to the Jury

Family and Children’s Services of the Waterloo Region v. J.V., 2017 ONCA 194

Keywords: Publication Ban, Endorsement, Family Law, Custody, Crown Wardship, Child and Family Services Act

Miracle v Maracle III, 2017 ONCA 195

Keywords: Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Rules of Civil Procedure Adding Parties, Rule 48.04(1), Motions after Action Set Down for Trial, Jurisdiction

Yan v. Nadarajah, 2017 ONCA 196

Keywords: Endorsement, Contracts, Real Estate, Specific Performance, Summary Judgment, Credibility, Rule in Browne v. Dunn,

Thorne v. Hudson Estate, 2017 ONCA 208

Keywords: Torts, Negligent Misrepresentation, Conflict of Laws, Choice of Law, Lex Loci Delicti, Tolofson v. Jensen, Summary Judgment

For Civil Endorsementsclick here 

For Criminal Decisionsclick here 

Civil Decisions: 

 Norman v. van Meppelen Scheppink, 2017 ONCA 192

[Juriansz, Brown and Miller JJ.A.] 

Counsel:

R. Shawn Stringer, for the appellants

J. D. Virtue and J. J. Mays, for the respondents

Keywords: Endorsement, Torts, MVA, Charge to the Jury

Facts:

The appellant was driving westbound on a two-lane road when a vehicle travelling in the eastbound direction was struck from behind causing it to spin, flip onto its roof and cross over into the westbound lane. The appellant’s vehicle collided with that vehicle in what was termed at trial, “the second collision”. The jury found there was negligence on the part of the appellant that caused or contributed to the second collision.

The respondents had settled their claim against the driver who caused the first collision, and had also settled the quantum of damages with the appellant. Consequently, the only question for the jury was whether the appellant was negligent.

Issue:

(1) Did the trial judge err in charging the jury on holding a driver to the standard of perfection?

(2) Did the trial judge err in charging the jury that “a prudent motorist should drive at a rate of speed and with his vehicle under such control that the motorist is able to pull up within the range of his vision”?

(3) Did the trial judge err by failing to provide adequate instructions in response to improper closing submissions of respondents’ trial counsel?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

(1) No. The trial judge repeatedly instructed the jury that the law does not hold a driver to a standard of perfection. Moreover, there was ample evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could find the appellant was negligent. The evidence of the respondents’ accident reconstruction expert, by itself, would support the verdict. Eyewitness testimony of others, including the driver of the respondents’ vehicle, was available evidence, which if accepted by the jury, would support the verdict.

(2) No. The court agreed that this instruction was inappropriate in the circumstances of this case. Nevertheless, upon considering the charge as a whole against the backdrop of the evidence led at trial the court did not think this isolated sentence would have caused the jury to engage in an incorrect analysis.

(3) No. The court rejected the attempt by counsel for the respondent to rationalize these closing submissions as factually correct and made as part of an earnest and fulsome plea to the jury seeking compensation for an injured child. The parties had settled the issue of damages. These remarks were said to be so evidently irrelevant and improper, the court inferred that counsel had made them deliberately in an attempt to influence the jury.

 Family and Children’s Services of the Waterloo Region v. J.V., 2017 ONCA 194

[MacFarland, van Rensburg and Huscroft JJ.A.]

Counsel:

B. Gratl, for the appellants, J.V. and M.V.

J. Boich, for the respondent, the Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo

Keywords: Publication Ban, Endorsement, Family Law, Custody, Crown Wardship, Child and Family Services Act

Facts:

A.M.D.V. (“the child”) was born on March 2, 2013. Her biological mother was C.V. and her biological father was J.S. C.V. had Alcohol Related Neurodevelopmental Disorder (ARND), a form of permanent brain damage caused by prenatal exposure to alcohol which, through no fault of her own, made her incapable of parenting her child.

On March 5, 2013, the appellant maternal grandparents put forth a plan for the care of A.M.D.V. whereby their daughter, C.V., would continue to reside in their house and be supervised at all times with the child. The grandparents then amended their plan on June 25, 2013, requesting a custody order pursuant to s. 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act, but stated they were also willing to adopt the child.

The child had been apprehended at birth by the Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo (the “Society”), and placed in a temporary foster home. At the end of November 2013, the child was placed in a foster home with a family who have indicated a desire to adopt her. The child has remained in this home continuously since November 2013 with her foster parents and their son.

At trial, the Society took the position that it was not in A.M.D.V.’s best interest to be placed in the care of her grandparents due to numerous concerns, including the conflict between the mother and grandparents, concerns that their plan was not permanent, the grandfather’s lack of motivation to put forth a plan for A.M.D.V., and concerns relating to their age and the grandfather’s health. Therefore, the Society sought an order for Crown wardship without access, with a plan for A.M.D.V. to be adopted by her current foster parents. Neill J. declared the child be made a Crown ward and placed in the care of the Society without access.

Reilly J. dismissed the appeal brought by C.V and her parents. Neither C.V. nor J.S. participated in the further appeal before the Court of Appeal brought by C.V.’s parents (the maternal grandparents of the child).

Issues:

(1) Could the appellants adduce fresh evidence on appeal?

(2) Were the reasons of the appeal judge insufficient?

(3) Did C.V. have the requisite capacity to participate in the original proceedings?

(4) Had C.V. been discriminated against in violation of the Charter?

(5) Was an expert report relied up on at trial outdated?

(6) Did the Society move precipitously to make the child a Crown ward?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

(1) No. The appellants before the Court were not parties when this matter proceeded before Neill J. They were advised by the Society early on in the process to seek independent legal advice and did so. Nevertheless, not until the appeal to the Superior Court of Justice did they seek to be added as parties. The record was replete with references to the Society’s early efforts to have the appellants submit a permanent plan of care, but they resisted.

The appellants’ proposed fresh evidence included information with respect to deficiencies in the SAFE assessment home study process that led to the refusal of the appellants as adoptive parents. However, the Court held that the issue with respect to the appellants’ suitability as permanent caregivers for the child was front and centre at the hearing before Neill J. Any and all issues in relation to the SAFE protocol could and should have been raised at that time and some were.

Similarly, the appellants sought to admit a plan of care in response to the trial judgment which identified its deficiencies. The new plan of care proposed in the fresh evidence included the involvement of two persons whom the child has never met, given that she was apprehended at birth and celebrated her fourth birthday with her foster parents. The Court held it was simply too late in the process to put forward an alternate plan of care.

(2) No. While the reasons of the appeal judge were brief, read as a whole, the appeal judge essentially adopted the trial judge’s reasons as his own. In such circumstances, the Court of Appeal was in effect sitting on appeal from the decision of Neill J. Such a remedy has been adopted by the Court on previous occasions: see R. v. Minuskin, [2003], O.J. No. 523 (C.A.).

(3) No. C.V. at the time of trial was 19 years of age and was represented at trial by experienced counsel. No issue was raised at that time about her competence or capacity to instruct counsel and the trial proceeded over nine days in May and September of 2014. No issue was raised about C.V.’s capacity until the hearing of the appeal before the Court. Capacity is presumed until the presumption is rebutted and on the record all of the evidence favoured the conclusion that C.V. had capacity at the time of trial.

(4) No. The constitutional issues were raised for the first time on appeal. There was no record created at trial in reference to constitutional issues. “It is rare that an appellate court will entertain such issues when they are raised there for the first time.” Furthermore, the record below contained no evidence that would support any allegation that C.V. or the appellants suffered discriminatory treatment at the hands of the Society or anyone else.

(5) No. The appellants faulted the Society for its failure to obtain an updated report from Dr. Scott, a pediatric neuropsychologist, who completed a neuropsychological assessment, which they argued, would reflect the positive changes C.V. has made in her life since the child’s birth. The Court recognized that C.V. had worked hard to improve her life since the child’s birth. However, it was not “utter speculation” on the Society’s part to be concerned about future incidents of violence and concern involving C.V. and her mother, to whom she was frequently in conflict with. C.V.’s disability was both a permanent and a pervasive developmental disorder.

(6) No. The record simply did not support the appellants’ argument that the Society’s actions were precipitous. Further, the record negated the allegation that the Society had decided at the very outset when the child was born that she would be made a Crown ward and did not seriously consider the appellants’ desire to parent the child. To the contrary, the evidence before Neill J. disclosed the efforts the Society workers made both before and after the child’s birth to encourage the appellants to put forward a permanent plan and to seek legal advice. They did obtain legal advice, but a plan was only put forward during the trial. The trial judge carefully considered the evidence and her findings were all soundly based on the evidence before her.

 Miracle v Maracle III, 2017 ONCA 195

[Sharpe, Lauwers and Hourigan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G. Bogue, for the appellant

A. Fotheringham, for the respondent, CIBC and for the proposed parties, Sherry Walker and Victor Dodig

Roger Horst and Rafal Szymanski, for the proposed party, Chief R. Donald Maracle

Keywords: Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Rules of Civil Procedure Adding Parties, Rule 48.04(1), Motions after Action Set Down for Trial, Jurisdiction

Facts:

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion seeking to add defendants to the action and award damages against them; seeking an order striking down the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I–5, and declaring the line north of the 49th parallel to be held communally; and seeking punitive damages in the amount of $24 million.

The motion arose in the context of an action by the appellant against his son, his son’s wife, and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (“CIBC”). The claim arose from a dispute over a convenience store business and a bank account the business had at the CIBC. None of the proposed defendants are parties to the dispute and there are no allegations made against those proposed defendants in the pleadings. The motion was brought after the action had been set down for trial. Because the appellant failed to obtain leave to bring the motion, the motion judge dismissed it on the basis of rule 48.04(1), which provides that subject to certain exceptions, “any party who has set an action down for trial … shall not initiate or continue any motion or form of discovery without leave of the court“.

The appellant asked the Court of Appeal to reverse the decision of the motion judge and to proclaim “a decree of default judgment” against various parties. He raised a number of grounds of appeal, including that the motion judge erred by failing to “move the court into its exclusive equitable jurisdiction”. He submitted that this case should be referred to a court of equity as it existed prior to 1881 and that the Court of Appeal lacks jurisdiction because of the appellant’s alleged Métis status.

At the outset of the appeal, counsel for the appellant asked that the appeal be heard by a differently constituted panel. He objected to Sharpe J.A. sitting on the appeal because he was a member of the panel that previously decided a case against the appellant. Counsel further objected to Hourigan J.A. sitting on the appeal due to his previous role as a senior member of the staff in the office of the Attorney General of Ontario. Counsel submitted that these prior associations raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Issue:

(1) Whether the appellant’s request that the appeal be heard by a differently constituted panel as a result of reasonable apprehension of bias should be granted.

(2) Whether the motion judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s motion.

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

(1) No. The test for reasonable apprehension of bias laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada asks what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that the decision-maker, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly? (Yukon Francophone School Board, Education area No. 23 v Yukon Territory (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25 at paras 20-21). The reasonable observer is not a person with a “very sensitive or scrupulous conscience”: R. v S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 SCR 484 at para 31. Rather, it is the “sort of person who always reserves judgment on every point until she has seen and fully understood both sides of the argument” and who “takes the trouble to read the text of an article as well as the headlines”: Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2008] UKHL 62 at para 3.

The test was not met in the circumstances before the Court. The issues arising in Tyendinaga Mohawk Council v Brant were strictly legal in nature and distinct from the issues posed on the appeal before the Court. A reasonable observer would not conclude that, because a judge had ruled against a party on a legal issue in one case, that judge, whether consciously or unconsciously, would likely be biased when deciding a different legal issue with respect to that same party in another case. Moreover, there was no connection between anything done in the course of Hourigan J.A.’s prior employment in the office of the Attorney General of Ontario and the issues raised on the appeal before the court. There was no merit to the appellant’s contention that Hourigan J.A.’s prior employment gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court also noted that the appellant made similar allegations of bias against a differently constituted panel when the appeal was listed for hearing.

(2) No. The appellant’s arguments lacked any legal foundation. The appellant brought his actions in the Superior Court of Justice and was bound by the Rules of Civil Procedure. His Aboriginal or Métis status did not exempt him from the Rules. The appellant’s motion to add additional parties after the action had been set down for trial without first obtaining leave was a breach of Rule 48.04(1). The appellant failed to demonstrate any error made by the motion judge in dismissing the motion.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant was not to be permitted to take any further actions against any of these parties without leave of the judge of the Court of Appeal if the costs ordered by the Court of Appeal have not first been paid.

 Yan v. Nadarajah, 2017 ONCA 196

[Sharpe, Lauwers and Hourigan, JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Lachmansingh and I. Vinogradova, for the appellants/ respondents by way of cross-appeal
J. H. Chow, for the respondents/ appellants by way of cross-appeal

Keywords: Endorsement, Contracts, Real Estate, Specific Performance, Summary Judgment, Credibility, Rule in Browne v. Dunn,

Facts:

The appellants were the vendors and the respondents were the purchasers in a residential real estate transaction that the appellants refused to close. The respondents sued for specific performance and were awared it on a motion for summary judgment.

The appellants appealed the granting of the summary judgment motion.  They argue that if the respondents were entitled to a remedy, it would be damages and not specific performance. The respondents cross-appealed, submitting that the motion judge erred in not awarding them damages for various expenses flowing from the aborted transaction.

Issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err in granting the summary judgment motion?

(2) Did the motion judge err in concluding that the respondents’ counsel did not violate the rule in Browne v. Dunn (1893), 6 R. 67 (H.L.)?

(3) Did the motion judge err in proceeding with the summary judgment motion even though the appellants’ spouses had not been served?

(4) Did the motion judge err in granting specific performance?

(5) Did the motion judge err in calculating the amount of damages?

Holding:

Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

(1) No. The trial judge did not err in granting specific performance on the summary judgment motion. The trial judge found that she was able to determine the issues in this action on the material before her without resort to the fact-finding powers under r. 20. This case turned on credibility issues, and the motion judge found that the appellants were not credible. There was ample evidence to support this finding. Indeed, such a finding was virtually inescapable, given that the appellants had offered inconsistent accounts regarding their participation in the transaction and their evidence was inconsistent with that of their own real estate agent. There is no error in the motion judge’s summary judgment analysis.

(2) No. The respondents’ counsel did not violate the rule in Browne v. Dunn (1893), 6 R. 67 (H.L.). The appellant submitted that the breach of the rule occurred during their cross-examination when the respondents’ counsel failed to point them to their evidence in earlier affidavits they had sworn to set aside a noting in default and CPLs registered on title, ask them whether they made the statements and give them an opportunity to explain any contradictions. The appellants submit that as a consequence of this breach of the Rule in Browne v. Dunn, the respondents cannot rely on the evidence in the prior affidavits.

The rule in Browne v Dunn was not offended here. In the present case, there was no element of the kind of unfairness or surprise that the rule in Browne v. Dunn protects against. The contradictory evidence used to impeach the appellants came in the form of the appellants’ own prior affidavits. Moreover, at the beginning of the cross-examination, the appellants were asked whether there was anything in their new affidavits that was incorrect or needed to be changed. They declined to make any changes or corrections. In the circumstances, there was no violation of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

(3) No. The motion judge did not err in proceeding with the summary judgment motion even though the appellants’ spouses had not been served. The appellants were unable to provide any authority in support of their position that service of the spouses was required. The motion judge did not make an error in her analysis. There was ample evidence to suggest that both spouses agreed to the sale of the residence. There was no evidence that they took any steps to assert any rights under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F3, to set aside the sale of the residence.

(4) No. The motion judge did not err in granting specific performance. The granting of an order for specific performance is discretionary. The motion judge made no errors in principle in the exercise of her discretion. The motion judge properly considered the issue of delay and the unique principles of the property before reaching her decision. Therefore, there is no basis for appellate interference.

(5) No. The motion judge did not err in the amount of damages. The respondents tendered evidence on the motion regarding costs they incurred as a result of the aborted transaction, including evidence of the cost of rent for alternative accommodation and insurance costs. They did not, however, provide details regarding the carrying costs they would have incurred had the transaction closed. Consequently, it is not possible for the court to quantify any damages that might have resulted from the appellants’ breach.

 Thorne v. Hudson Estate, 2017 ONCA 208

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Gillese and Brown JJ.A.]

Counsel:

H. Book, for the appellants

T. Trembley, R. Fenn and A. Tomlinson, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Negligent Misrepresentation, Conflict of Laws, Choice of Law, Lex Loci Delicti, Tolofson v. Jensen, Summary Judgment

Facts:

During the course of a flight from Oshawa, Ontario to Wilmington, Delaware in May 2007, a twin-engine Beech aircraft lost power in its left engine. The plane crashed shortly after aborting an attempted emergency landing at an airfield in Dunkirk, New York. The two pilots and the passenger were killed.

The estates are suing the companies that inspected and maintained the plane’s engine – the respondents, 1205055 Ontario Limited c.o.b. Aviation Technical Consultants (“ATC”) and Corporate Aircraft Restorations Inc., together with its employee, Maurice Nesbitt (collectively “CAR”). As well, the estates are suing the manufacturer of the engine, the appellant Continental Motors, Inc. (“CMI”).

ATC and CAR assert third party and cross-claims against CMI alleging (i) the improper design and manufacture of the engine and replacement parts, (ii) misleading repair instructions, and (iii) the failure to warn about certain engine failures.

CMI moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claims asserted against it were barred by the United States federal General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (“GARA”), Pub.L. No. 103 298, 108 Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 notes). Essentially, GARA bars a civil action against an aircraft manufacturer for damages for deaths arising out of an accident involving an aircraft which is brought more than 18 years after the date of delivery of the aircraft. In the present case, CMI originally delivered the aircraft in early 1968.

CMI argued that since the aircraft crashed in New York State, GARA applied and barred the various claims against it. The motion judge dismissed CMI’s summary judgment motion and declared Ontario law applies to the proceedings.

Issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err by dismissing the motion for summary judgment?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

(1) No. The motion judge correctly concluded that the principles set out in Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 govern the choice of law in tort. In Tolofson, the Supreme Court held that “the law to be applied in torts is the law of the place where the activity occurred, i.e., the lex loci delicti.”

The Court concluded that there was no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge characterizing the “crux” of the claims against CMI as negligent misrepresentations regarding engine repair bulletins and manuals, not negligence in the production of the engine itself. Therefore, there was no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that Ontario law applies to the negligent misrepresentation claims.

Moreover, the record did not support CMI’s argument that GARA would bar the claims against it in the event New York law applied. In his reasons, the motion judge referred to the two expert opinions adduced on the scope of GARA. Both experts considered the decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, in Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 522 F.3d 948 (2008), which held: “Congress has no power to tell courts of foreign countries whether they could entertain a suit against an American defendant. It would be up to any foreign court to determine whether it wanted to apply GARA to litigation occurring within its borders…”

Civil Endorsements: 

Density Group Limited v. HK Hotels LLC, 2017 ONCA 205

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Gillese and Brown JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. S. Steinberg, for the moving party

D. Boghosian, for the responding parties

Keywords: Endorsement, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Interlocutory Orders, Motion to Quash

Sweeting v. Mok, 2017 ONCA 203

[Juriansz, Brown and Miller JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. D. Ayotte and M. W. Gunsolus, for the appellant

J. R. Dunn, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Employment Law, Wrongful Dismissal, Evidence, Credibility, Standard of Review, Overriding and Palpable Error

BDO Canada Limited v. Gottardo, 2017 ONCA 207

[Juriansz, Watt and Brown JJ.A.]

Counsel:

No one appearing for the appellant

C. Linthwaite, for the respondents David Gottardo, Bruno Gottardo and Kleinridge Investments Inc.

M. Poliak, for the respondent BDO Canada Limited

Keywords: Endorsement, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, Stay of Proceedings

ICICI Bank Canada v. Thompson, 2017 ONCA 202

[Juriansz, Brown and Miller JJ.A.]

Counsel:

No one appearing for the appellants

J. M. Butson and C. Internicola, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Costs

 Criminal Decisions: 

Ontario (Attorney General) v. $44,425 In Canadian Currency (In Rem), 2017 ONCA 201

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Gillese and Brown JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Langevin, for the appellant

J. Malabar, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Proceeds of Crime, Crown Forfeiture, Civil Remedies Act, 2001

R. v. Yeung, 2017 ONCA 190

[MacFarland, Pardu and Trotter JJ.A]

Counsel:

M. Macchia, for the appellant

L. Schwalm, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Attempt to Obstruct Justice

R. v. Zerat, 2017 ONCA 193

[MacFarland, Pardu and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

B. E. Zerat, acting in person

H. Freeman, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Mischief to Property Under $5,000, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias

Hannora (Re), 2017 ONCA 191

[MacFarland, Pardu and Trotter JJ.A]

Counsel: 

D. Lumba for the appellant

C. Laviolette for the respondent, Ontario Shores

B. Cohen for the respondent, Ministry of Attorney General

Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Ontario Review Board, Criminal Code of Canada, s. 672.54, Mental Disorder, Risk to Public

R. v. Kirlew, 2017 ONCA 171

[Cronk, Rouleau and Miller JJ.A.]

Counsel:

H. Halfyard and B. Vandebeek, for the appellant

K. Beaudoin, for the respondent

Keywords: Publication Ban, Criminal Law, Possession of Child Pornography, Credibility, The Rule in Browne v. Dunn (1893), 6 R. 67 (H.L.)

R. v. Krouglov, 2017 ONCA 197

Counsel:

R. Krouglov, acting in person

I. R. Smith, duty counsel

S. Magotiaux, for the respondent

Keywords: Publication Ban, Criminal Law, Aggravated Sexual Assault, Sexual Interference, Assault with a Weapon, Uttering Death Threats, Sentencing

R. v. Thompson, 2017 ONCA 204

[MacFarland, van Rensburg, and Huscroft JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Penman, for the appellant

J. Neander, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Evidence, Application to Exclude

R. v. Campbell, 2017 ONCA 209

[Laskin, Hourigan, and Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:

W. A. Munoz, for the appellant

A. Alyea, for the respondent

Keywords: Publication Ban, Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Sexual Exploitation, Evidence, Admissibility, Records, Procedural and Natural Justice, Sufficiency of Reasons

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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