Below are the summaries for this week’s civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario. There were several family law decisions. In Cheng v. Liu, the court dealt with whether it had jurisdiction to hear a corollary relief proceeding under the Divorce Act after a valid divorce in a foreign jurisdiction (no, but relief for child support can be sought under Ontario’s FLA). In R.G. v. K.G, the court considered an application by a minor for a declaration that she had been removed from the care of her father. Gray v. Gray dealt with procedural issues in family law (whether a default trial judgment should be appealed or a motion brought to set it aside – the latter). In Meehan v. Good, the court made it clear that a lawyer’s duty to his or her client may go beyond the four corners of the scope of the retainer, and may change over time as a matter progresses and new information comes to light. In U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (Re), the court denied leave to appeal from an order of a CCCA judge.
Have a nice weekend!
Blaney McMurtry LLP
Table of Contents:
Civil Decisions (click on case name to read summary):
[Strathy C.J.O., MacPherson and Hourigan JJ.A.]
S. M. Fehrle, for the appellant
C. P. Goldson, for the respondent
Keywords: Family Law, Divorce Act, Family Law Act, Jurisdiction, Divorce, Corollary Relief, Spousal Support, Child Support, Equalization of Net Family Property
The trial judge ruled that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim for corollary relief under the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2d Supp), despite the fact that the parties’ divorce had been validly granted by a foreign court. In so ruling, he distinguished this case from Okmyansky v Okmyansky, 2007 ONCA 427, where the Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion.
The appellant is a Canadian citizen resident in Mississauga since 2005. He is an engineer, and his assets, property and sources of income are all in Canada. The respondent resides in China and has never been to Canada. The parties were married in China in August 2006. Their daughter, Chang, was born in February 2007 and resided with the respondent in China her entire life. The parties separated in December 2007 according to the appellant, and January 2008 according to the respondent.
The respondent brought a divorce application in Ontario in March 2009. She sought a divorce, spousal support, child support and custody of Chang (“corollary relief”) pursuant to the Divorce Act, and equalization of net family property pursuant to the FLA.
On January 26, 2010 the appellant brought a divorce application in China, seeking a divorce, custody of Chang and equalization of property.
Meanwhile in Canada, the respondent brought a motion in February 2010 before Quigley J who ordered the appellant to pay temporary monthly child support of $825.
In April 2010 the appellant brought a motion to stay the matrimonial proceeding in Ontario so that it could be heard in China. The respondent sought to have the application heard in Ontario. Justice Baltman concluded that the Ontario court had jurisdiction to hear the application as the husband had been resident in Ontario for the year immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding. However, she noted that the issues of custody and access would have to be determined in China. Justice Baltman concluded that China was the more appropriate forum for the matrimonial proceeding, and that the application in Ontario should be stayed.
The Chinese family court granted the divorce and awarded custody of Chang to the respondent, as well as sole ownership of the real property she had purchased in China prior to the marriage.
The Chinese court declined to exercise its jurisdiction to determine support and equalization. After unsuccessfully appealing this decision, the respondent brought a motion in Ontario Superior Court to lift the stay of the Ontario application, arguing that the stay should be lifted because the appellant had breached the orders of the Chinese court to make full financial disclosure and thereby breached terms of a previous order of the Ontario court.
After a trial management conference, the first issue to be determined was jurisdiction. Depending on the outcome, a trial on the merits would be held.
The trial judge held that the Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction to determine the issues of child support, spousal support and equalization of net family property.
- Does an Ontario court have jurisdiction to hear and determine a corollary relief proceeding under the Divorce Act following a valid divorce order made in a foreign jurisdiction?
- Does an Ontario court have jurisdiction under the FLA to determine the issue of child support after a foreign court has issued a divorce?
- No. The Court referred to its previous decision in Okmyansky, where it was held that nothing in the legislative history of the Divorce Act indicates that Parliament intended the 1993 amendment to confer jurisdiction on Canadian courts to hear and determine corollary relief proceedings following a valid divorce in a foreign jurisdiction. The case is clear and unequivocal authority that an Ontario court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine a corollary relief proceeding under the Divorce Act following a valid foreign divorce. The trial judge erred in law when he attempted to distinguish this case from Okmyansky.
- Yes. Where a court issuing a divorce has not adjudicated the issue of child support, provincial legislation is a valid means of seeking a child support remedy. The principles developed in the case law are analogous to a situation where a foreign court grants a valid divorce, but does not deal with child support. In the present case, while there is a valid divorce in place issued by the Chinese court, that court has expressly ruled that the issue of child support is better determined by the Ontario courts. There is no statutory prohibition against using the FLA in such circumstances. Indeed, the use of the FLA to provide a remedy is consistent with the statuary objective of ensuring that parents provide support for their dependent children. Ontario courts have the authority to award child support under s 33 of the FLA. There is nothing in the legislation that restricts that authority in situations where a divorce order has been granted outside of Canada. The use of the FLA in circumstances where relief under the Divorce Act is unavailable does not engage the paramountcy doctrine, as there is no operational incompatibility between the federal and provincial statutes. To the contrary, the two statutes are operating harmoniously to ensure that a remedy for child support is available.
[Gillese, Benotto and Roberts JJ.A.]
G. Joseph and R. Kniznik, for the appellant
C. Doris, for the respondent, K.G.
J.Mark and E. Chan, for the respondent, O.G.
Keywords: Family Law, Custody, Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, Fresh Evidence, R. v. Palmer,  1 S.C.R. 759
Facts: This appeal concerns an application by a minor (“O.G.”) for a declaration that she has withdrawn from parental control. The father (the “appellant”) of a now 17-year-old girl appeals a declaration that she has withdrawn from parental control. If his appeal is successful, he also appeals an order which held that, in light of the declaration, the issue of her custody is moot. The parties are diametrically opposed with respect to the application process and the factors for the court to consider. The father submits that the parents must be parties to an application for a declaration, with full rights to object, file evidence and cross-examine. He submits that the application judge’s failure to add him as a party is a basis to overturn the declaration. The respondents (the child and her mother, “K.G.”) submit that the parents are not required to be parties because the child has an absolute right to the declaration and the only function of the court on an application for a declaration is to verify that the child has reached the age of 16 in accordance with s. 65 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 (CLRA).
The father appeals the orders of Kiteley J. and Gibson J. He also seeks to admit fresh evidence with respect to both appeals.
- Is the fresh evidence admissible?
- Are the parents required to be parties to the application for a declaration that a child has withdrawn from parental control?
- What factors are considered on an application for a declaration that a child has withdrawn from parental control?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
- No. The principles governing the admissibility of fresh evidence on appeal are outlined in R. v. Palmer,  1 S.C.R. 759 at p. 775. The Palmer test requires the applicant to satisfy four criteria: (i) the evidence could not have been adduced at trial; (ii) the evidence must be relevant in that it bears on a decisive or potentially decisive issue; (iii) the evidence must be reasonably capable of belief; and (iv) the evidence must be such that, if believed, it could reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result.
The father raised the issue of “Stockholm syndrome” before Gibson J. The motion judge characterized this as a belief by the father that the mother “continues to illegally influence [O.G.] in disastrous ways” such that the child is “continually acceding to [the mother’s] perverse will.” The motion judge commented that these allegations were unsubstantiated by any expert or other evidence. The father raised the issue again before Kiteley J. on August 18, 2016. He asserted that O.G. is the victim of a “trauma bond” imposed by the mother. He submitted a letter from a physician in Michigan which describes “trauma bond” and “situations of Stockholm syndrome”. The application judge attached no evidentiary value to the letter or the father’s reliance on it.
This letter, now in the form of an affidavit from Dr. Frank M. Ochberg, a Michigan psychiatrist, sworn November 7, 2016, is the proposed fresh evidence. The psychiatrist indicates that he could not previously provide sworn testimony due to medical issues and reiterates the contents of his previous letter. He has never met O.G. The father seeks to have this evidence admitted to establish that O.G. is not acting of her own free will but rather has been brainwashed by her mother, who is essentially her captor.
The proposed evidence does not meet the test set out in Palmer. It is not “fresh” but the reiteration of a theory already raised and rejected twice. In the face of the extensive record regarding O.G., the affidavit from a psychiatrist who has never met her could not reasonably have affected the result.
- Yes. First, as explained in R. v. Solosky  1 S.C.R. 821, declaratory relief involves “persons sharing a legal relationship” in respect of which the “relative interests” of each are to be determined. Here, the relationship shared is that of parent and child. The relevant interests are the independence of the child and the custodial interests of the parent. The parent may have an interest to oppose the declaration. As noted in Solosky, the person requesting the relief must “secure a proper contradictor”, that is, “someone […] who has a true interest to oppose the declaration sought.”
Second, s. 62(3) of the CLRA provides that the parents must be before the court in an application in respect of a child. Although the heading under Part III states “Custody, Access and Guardianship”, the provisions of s. 62(3) state that, in an application under Part III “in respect of” a child, the parents are to be parties. It is not limited to custody, access and guardianship issues.
Although the Court of Appeal concludes that the parents are to be parties to the application for a declaration, the court retains discretion to direct their involvement and participation in the application. The father suggests that he should have all the usual rights including introducing and cross-examining on affidavits. This, however, is not automatic. The judge hearing the application will determine, based on the unique facts before her, what degree of participation is appropriate. Courts maintain an inherent jurisdiction to control their process.
In addition, r. 1(7.2) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 gives the court the authority to make orders for directions and conditions respecting procedural matters as the court considers just. Each case must turn on its own facts and is subject to the discretion of the application judge.
Here, the application judge did not accept the father’s submission that he should be a party. However, to the extent that this was an error, it was cured by her conduct of the hearing. The father was permitted to file material and make submissions. The application judge fully and thoroughly canvassed all of the evidence before her and made findings based on that evidence.
- O.G. submits that because she has the unfettered right to withdraw from parental control, she has an unfettered right to the declaratory relief that she sought. She submits that the court should consider nothing but that she is over the age of 16. She says that “there is no consideration of the mental capacity or circumstances of the child. There are no-pre-conditions, qualifiers, or exceptions to this right. Indeed, the only consideration is the age of the child.”
The Court of Appeal does not agree with this broad proposition. When declaratory relief is sought, the court should inquire into the reasons why the declaration is sought, the utility of the remedy and whether, if it is granted, it will resolve the issue between the parties. The reasons of the application judge are clear that the declaration was necessary to allow O.G. to attend university and resolve the dispute with her father. It is also significant that the application judge considered the extensive record and grounded her conclusions based on the best interests of O.G.
The application judge fully considered O.G.’s best interests and satisfied herself that the declaration was necessary and appropriate in all the circumstances. There was no procedural unfairness and her findings were supported by the evidence. The declaratory relief was not exercised in a vacuum. There was a clear reason for it.
[Simmons, Brown and Roberts JJ.A.]
B. Rumble and A. Goldberg, for the appellants
J. Obagi, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Contracts, Torts, Professional Negligence, Lawyers, Duty of Care, Scope of Retainer, Summary Judgment
Facts: The appellants appeal from dismissal summary judgment dismissing their claims against their former lawyer, the respondent, John Cardill.
The motion judge determined that the appellants retained Mr. Cardill to represent them only with respect to the assessment of the accounts of their former lawyer, Donald Good, who had represented the appellants in the settlement of their tort and accident benefits claims arising out of a motor vehicle accident. She found that Mr. Cardill had advised the appellants on a number of occasions to seek legal advice regarding the negligence issue.
The motion judge concluded that Mr. Cardill was neither retained nor owed the appellants a duty of care to either pursue or provide them with legal advice regarding the possible negligence action. Consequently, she held that it was not necessary to make any findings as to whether Mr. Cardill had advised the appellants about the limitation period in relation to a possible negligence action against Mr. Good.
Issue: Did the motion judge err in concluding that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial?
Holding: Appeal allowed.
Yes. It was necessary for the motion judge to consider the retainer agreement as well as all other relevant surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether there was a genuine issue requiring a trial. By failing to take into account all material facts, she erred in concluding that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissing the appellants’ action.
Defining the scope of the lawyer’s retainer is an essential element of the analysis into whether or not a duty of care is owed to the client, per Broesky v. Lüst, 2011 ONSC 167 at para 69; aff’d, 2012 ONCA 701. However, it is not the end of the analysis where it is alleged that the lawyer’s duty of care arises out of and extends beyond the retainer.
Where such an allegation is made, the court must meticulously examine all of the relevant surrounding circumstances, including but not limited to, the form and nature of the client’s instructions and the sophistication of the client, to determine whether a duty is owed beyond the four corners of the retainer: Connerty v. Coles, 2012 ONSC 2787 at paras 12 to 15.
The motion judge failed to do this. Rather, her analysis focussed narrowly on the written retainer between Mr. Cardill and the appellants. As a result, she determined that no duty was owed. However, the motion judge did not explain how she was able to conclude that Mr. Cardill did not owe the appellants a duty to advise about the existence of the applicable limitation period, given the following facts: (i) the change over the course of Mr. Cardill’s assessment retainer of his views about the competency of the representation Mr. Good had provided the appellants; (ii) his advice to the appellants that in the assessment proceeding against Mr. Good they should allege he had been negligent; and (iii) his advice to the appellants that they might have a negligence claim against Mr. Good and should consult other counsel on the matter.
[Doherty, MacPherson and Lauwers JJ.A.]
M. H. Tweyman, for the applicant
A. Feldstein, for the respondent
C. Boyd, for the Regional Municipality of Durham
Keywords: Family Law, Support, Variation, Civil Procedure, Orders, Setting Aside, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Family Law Rules, r. 25(19)
The parties married in 1997 and separated in 2005. They have three children. In 2006, Rowsell J. of the Family Court ordered on consent that the father pay child and spousal support of $700 and $1,200 respectively, commencing in 2007. In early 2014, the father started a variation application, seeking to reduce his child support obligation, to cease paying spousal support, and to rescind all his support arrears that accumulated under Rowsell J.’s order.
The parties attended a trial management conference on May 13, 2016. Pursuant to the trial scheduling endorsement, all exhibits were to be served as soon as possible, the opening statements would be oral, and the parties could file late expert reports. Any admissibility issues would be determined by the trial judge. The trial was scheduled for May 25, 2016.
The father did not attend at trial. A friend appeared to explain his absence to the trial judge. The friend stated that the father has multiple sclerosis, which makes it very difficult for him to find work in construction. She explained that the father learned on the eve of trial that he had secured employment, and could not attend court because it was his first day of work. The trial judge decided that the father’s employment did not excuse his absence, and proceeded without him. According to the transcript, the trial judge stated, “[s]o the evidence I’m prepared to hear, very simply, is, essentially, on default.”
The trial judge’s order fixed child support arrears at $191,924 for the years 2007 to 2015. The trial judge also ordered the father to pay ongoing monthly child support for the children in the amount of $2,159 based on an average annual income of $120,000.
In June 2016, the father commenced his appeal from the trial judge’s order at this court. Among other things, the father claims that the trial judge erred by failing to provide him with an opportunity to attend the trial, failing to provide sufficient reasons, permitting the mother to submit her expert report four days prior to the trial, and permitting the mother to submit as evidence her opening statement, which was not served on him prior to trial.
In July 2016, the father also commenced a motion in the Family Court to set aside or change the trial judge’s order pursuant to r. 25(19)(e) of the Family Law Rules. For various reasons, this motion has been adjourned on multiple occasions and has not yet been heard.
The mother brings a motion to quash the father’s appeal at the Court of Appeal. The mother submits that the trial judge’s order is akin to a default judgment, and therefore the proper procedural route is the motion to set aside in the Family Court. If the motion is unsuccessful, the father may then appeal to the Court of Appeal. The father has perfected his appeal and it is scheduled to be heard on February 27, 2017. The mother has not yet provided responding material because she is waiting for a decision on this motion to quash.
- Does a trial court have jurisdiction to set aside an order under r. 25(19)(e) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99?
- What is the proper procedural route in this case: (i) an appeal from the trial decision to the Court of Appeal or (ii) a motion to set aside the trial decision in the Family Court?
Holding: Motion to quash dismissed.
The appeal scheduling unit is ordered to de-list the matter until the father’s motion to set aside has been decided in the Family Court.
If the father’s motion to set aside is dismissed, he may appeal to the Court of Appeal by filing an amended Notice of Appeal.
- Yes. Rule 25(19)(e) includes the authority to set aside an order because:
(i) The definition of “change” in the Family Law Rules is quite broad. It means to “vary, suspend or discharge.” As an example of the wide scope of these terms, the definition of “discharge” in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary includes “to set aside.
(ii) A broad interpretation of r. 25(19) as including the authority to set aside an order is consistent with prior comments from the court. In Ketelaars v. Ketelaars, 2011 ONCA 349, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from a judgment following an uncontested trial. The appellant’s pleadings had been struck for failure to comply with various disclosure obligations. The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal for jurisdictional reasons. The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, stating at para. 5 that “[t]here are procedures available in the Superior Court to change, vary or set aside” such an order (emphasis added).
(iii) Most importantly, this interpretation of r. 25(19)(e) promotes the underlying philosophy, scheme, and purpose of the Family Law Rules. Rule 2(2) states that the “primary objective of these rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly.” While r. 1(7) permits a court to refer by analogy to the Rules of Civil Procedure where the family rules do not adequately cover a matter, such instances will be “rare”. The Family Law Rules are intended to be a complete procedural code.
An interpretation of “change” as including “set aside” best promotes the efficient and just resolution of family law matters. On a motion under r. 25(19)(e), the court may decide that the most efficient remedy is to vary the order at issue without setting it aside. However, the court may instead determine that the order needs be set aside entirely; a variation of the order at issue would not produce a just result.
There was no need to further consider the provisions and language from the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case, such as whether the trial judge’s order is analogous to a “default order”. An analysis of such terms would only confuse the scheme and narrative that are unique to family law litigation. Rule 25(19)(e) adequately covers the matter in this case.
- The proper procedural route in this case was to bring a motion under r. 25(1) of the Family Law Rules rather than to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
While the Court of Appeal retains jurisdiction to hear any appeal of a final order, r.25(19) provides a more effective way to correct orders within its ambit.
[Strathy C.J.O., Weiler and Benotto JJ.A.]
K. Rosenberg, L.Harmer, K. Jones and R. Healey, for the moving party, the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union
S. L.C. White, for the moving party, USW Local 1005
A. J. Hatnay, B. Walancik and A. Tang, for the moving party, Representative Counsel to the non-union active employees and retirees of U.S. Steel Canada Inc.
J. Gage and P. Steep, for the responding party, U.S. Steel Canada Inc.
R. Staley, K. Zych, and W. A. Bortolin, for the responding party, the Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.
Keywords: Endorsement, Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, Leave to Appeal
Facts: These motions for leave to appeal arise in the context of the ongoing proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, involving U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (“USSC”).
In 2015, an order was made suspending the payment of certain benefits, referred to as “OPEBs” (other post-employment benefits, for example, prescription, dental and vision benefits) to retirees. The United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (“USW”), together with its local unions and representative counsel to the non-USW active and retired members, jointly brought a motion.
They sought to have the payment of OPEBs reinstated on the basis that USSC’s financial position had improved since the 2015 order was made. The CCAA judge dismissed the motion on the condition that USSC make a one-time payment of $2.7 million towards the benefits. The moving parties now seek leave to appeal from that decision.
Issue: Should leave to appeal be granted?
Holding: Motion dismissed.
No. Leave to appeal is granted sparingly in CCAA proceedings and only where there are serious and arguable grounds that are of real and significant interest to the parties. Furthermore, it is rare that the Court of Appeal will interfere with a discretionary decision of a CCAA judge. In the court’s view, there was no prima facie merit to the moving parties’ submission that the court should do so in this case. The CCAA judge, who has extensive familiarity with the circumstances of the debtor, considered the evidence before him, the submissions of the parties and their respective “with prejudice” settlement discussions. He carefully balanced competing considerations, including the goal of a successful reorganization, which would benefit all interested parties, including the moving parties. In the final analysis, while he refused to reinstate the payment of benefits to the end of 2016, he ordered that USSC make a one-time payment of $2.7 million towards benefits.
The court was not satisfied that an appeal from that order has any real prospect of success. Given the fact-specific nature of the exercise of discretion in this case, the issue is not of significance to the insolvency practice.
Short Civil Decisions
[Feldman, Gillese and Pepall JJ.A]
R. Birken, for the appellants
A. Habas and C. Reed, for the respondent
[Weiler, Rouleau and Roberts JJ.A.]
H. Niroomand, for the appellants
M. Magonet, for the respondents
Keywords: Endorsement, Costs, Partial Indemnity
[Feldman, Gillese and Pepall JJ.A.]
J. Zibarras, for the appellant
D. J. Jackson, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase of Sale, Contractual Interpretation, Standard of Review, Deference
[Watt, Lauwers and Benotto JJ.A.]
G. Gonzalez, not present
A. Szigeti, appearing as Amicus Curiae
M. Callaghan, for the Attorney General of Ontario
J. Blackburn, for the person in charge of Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care
Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Threat to Public Safety, Criminal Code, s. 672.5401, Treatment Impasse, Standard of Review, Mazzei v. British Columbia (Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric Services), 2006 SCC 7,  1 S.C.R. 326, R. v. LePage  O.J. No. 4486 (C.A.)
[Simmons, Lauwers and Hourigan JJ.A.]
R. Cuervo-Lorens, in person
D. McConville, for the respondent Lynda L. Carpenter
A. Gibson, for the respondents Burloak Real Estate Services and Michael O’Sullivan
Keywords: Endorsement, Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale, Mitigation,, Summary Judgment
[Cronk, Juriansz and Brown JJ.A.]
S.Ahmad and M. Hackl, for the appellant
B. Baron and M. Pluto, for the respondents
Keywords: Endorsement, Costs, Offers to Settle, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49, Partial Indemnity, Substantial Indemnity
[Feldman, Gillese and Pepall JJ.A.]
R. Ryan, for the appellant
C. Diana and H. Evans, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Civil Procedure, Applications, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14.05(3)(d), Jurisdiction, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, Adjournment
[Strathy C.J.O., Weiler and Benotto JJ.A.]
M. J. Prost, for the appellant
J. Leeming, acting in person
Keywords: Endorsement, Family Law, Joint Custody, Contempt
[Simmons, Lauwers and Hourigan JJ.A. ]
Ghareeb Awad, in person
H. Wolch, for the respondents
Keywords: Endorsement, Contracts, Joint Ventures, Appeals, Extension of Time
[Simmons, Lauwers and Hourigan JJ.A. ]
M. E. Quintanar, in person
M. M. Dwyer, for the respondents
Keywords: Endorsement, Property Law, Rights-of-Way, Summary Judgement
[LaForme, Rouleau and Brown JJ.A.]
J. R. Presser and A. Menchynski, for the appellant
J. V. Palangio, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Dangerous Driving Causing Death, Dangerous Driving Causing Bodily Harm, Misapprehension of Evidence, Impermissible Speculation, Unreasonable Verdict
[Hoy A.C.J.O., Doherty and Miller JJ.A.]
M. E. Schiffer, for the appellant
D. Finley, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal law, Publication Ban, Sexual Assault, Intoxication, Sentencing, R. v. Smith,  O.J. No. 3832 (C.A.)
[Watt, Lauwers and Benotto JJ.A. ]
O. Goddard, for the appellant
B. Jones, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Publication Ban, Sentencing, Fresh Evidence, Rehabilitation, Custody, Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, s. 39(1)(a) and (d), s. 72(1)
The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.